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In their critical review of the prevention paradox (PP) applied to gambling-related harm, Delfabbro and King (2017)
raise a number of concerns regarding speciﬁc assumptions, methods, and ﬁndings as well as the general conceptual
approach. Besides discussing the PP, the review also considers the merits of considering a “continuum of harm,” as
opposed to the more traditional categorical approach to classifying problem gamblers. Their critique is carefully
modulated and balanced, and starts a useful dialogue in the context of a public health approach to gambling.
Unfortunately, some of Delfabbro and King’s (2017) arguments rest on the treatment of gambling harm as a binary
state and conﬂates gambling-related harm with disordered gambling. In this reply, we argue that the application of
PP logic to gambling harm has not yet been addressed by us, and is only indirectly related to the more important
objective of understanding how gambling can reduce ones’ quality of life.
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INTRODUCTION
As outlined by Delfabbro and King (2017), the prevention
paradox (PP) logic refers to a situation where “A large
number of people exposed to a low risk is likely to produce
more cases than a small number of people exposed to a high
risk” (Rose, 1981, p. 1849). The “paradox” arises because
the beneﬁts of any mass intervention in the low-risk popu-
lation are unlikely to have much beneﬁt to the vast majority
of people, and thus people have little incentive to support
such interventions. Why would I limit my alcohol intake, for
example, when it’s very unlikely to cause my death of rectal
cancer? Yet, these same mass interventions in low-risk
populations, if successful, are likely to greatly reduce death
and disease. In our work, we suggest that “gambling harm”
is the outcome that should be reduced and therefore it is
implicit that any mass interventions that reduce harm should
greatly increase public welfare. Of course, the PP may apply
here: people have little incentive to support such interven-
tions unless they can be framed as an immediate beneﬁt.
A FOCUS ON HARM RATHER THAN
MENTAL ILLNESS
Delfabbro and King (2017) go on to explore the application
of the PP to gambling-related harm, extracting two lines of
argument fundamental to the PP logic: (1) that the highest
number of problem cases emerge from the lower-risk pop-
ulation and (2) that the burden of harm and the
corresponding beneﬁts of intervention are greater in the
lower-risk population.
However, their interpretation of argument 1 is ambigu-
ous, as a “problem case” may be taken to refer to either (a) a
problem gambler (PG) case or (b) the prevalence of a
speciﬁc harm from gambling. Given the ﬁndings in three
main cited studies (Browne et al., 2016; Canale, Vieno, &
Grifﬁths, 2016; Raisamo, Mäkelä, Salonen, & Lintonen,
2015) related to the second interpretation (b), this is the one
that might well be assumed. However, in their discussion,
Delfabbro and King (2017) go on to discuss a potential merit
of the PP being that the low-risk population may be the
ultimate source of the majority of PGs, and imply that a
beneﬁt of focusing on lower-risk populations is to prevent
potential severe cases from arising. In contrast, we were not
focused on disordered gambling (a mental health condition)
as the outcome but rather the occurrence of individual
harms. This is the outcome that public health ofﬁcials most
want to prevent or at least reduce.
The ambiguity in deﬁning a “case” reﬂects an important
conceptual difﬁculty in applying PP logic to gambling.
Traditionally, PP clearly distinguishes between the risk
factor (e.g., smoking) and a single, discrete, diagnosable
harmful condition (e.g., lung cancer). For gambling harm, in
contrast, the risk factor is taken to be a measure of
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disordered gambling, mostly popularly measured by a pop-
ulation screen such as the Problem Gambling Severity Index
(PGSI; Ferris & Wynne, 2001), which classiﬁes individuals
as recreational gamblers (RG), low-risk gamblers (LR),
moderate-risk gamblers (MR), and PGs. However, there is
an immediate tautology – since gambling problems tradi-
tionally encompasses at least some negative consequences
(i.e., harms). Furthermore, potential speciﬁc indicators of
harm from gambling are highly comorbid, diverse, and
numerous. It becomes conceptually awkward – if not
misleading – to think of each indicator as a separate “case,”
as is needed to apply PP logic. In our view, it is much more
reasonable to treat them as mere indicators of gambling
harm, which is understood to occur on a continuum, from
mild to severe. Accordingly, Browne et al. (2016) do not
mention or address the PP at all in assessing the population-
level burden of gambling harm, but rather aimed to assess
the amount of harm, in aggregate, occurring in different
gambling problem risk categories.
WHY LANGUAGE MATTERS AND
CAUSES CONFUSION
The labeling of the PGSI categories creates a natural
opportunity for conceptual confusion. The so-called “low-
risk” gambling and “moderate-risk” gambling categories of
the PGSI suggest through labeling that they are simply
weigh-stations on the road to a full-ﬂedged mental health
problem. In fact, rather than representing “risk” for problem
gambling, these categories are only labels for people with
lesser collections of problem-gambling symptoms – includ-
ing negative consequences. The result from our work was
that, in aggregate and weighted by severity, the burden of
harm (in terms of quality of life, not the count of harms) was
occurring in the so-called “low-risk” category of consumers.
This is not the same proposition as the logic underlying the
PP, but rather a simpler observation that a collection of
people who had been assumed to be suffering zero to
minimal harm were, at least in aggregate, suffering the
greatest burden of harm in the population. Moreover, we
make no strong assumptions about the impact of any given
harm indicator, for example, credit card debt, but rather
consider the overall impact of all harms affecting each
person in our sample.
WHAT ABOUT THE PP?
Despite the conceptual problems in mapping the PP to
gambling problems, it nevertheless may be beneﬁcial to
explore the PP in this context. However, we must keep in
mind that in the context of gambling, the true PP logic
question is whether, for each speciﬁc indicator of gambling
harm, what proportion of instances emerge from RG, LR,
MR, and PG categories. For any discrete harm, if people can
accurately nominate whether that harm did or did not occur
because of their gambling, we can simply observe if more
cases of harm appear in the population from the categories
of RG, LR, MR, or PG. This would be an evidence base for
the PP, but necessarily evaluated separately for each harm as
a “case.” Given that we have no absolute measure of impact
for each indicator, such a ﬁnding does not directly bear on
the burden of harm. Our past results, however, used speciﬁc
harms as no more than stimuli for an independent evaluation
of per-person quality-of-life impact that was subsequently
aggregated for LR, MR, and PGs. Accordingly, our work
did not address (or rely on) the logic of the PP.
WHAT IS A “BAD HARM” AND WHO DECIDES?
Some speciﬁc harms may yield a negligible impact on
quality of life, while others may have a severe impact.
Delfabbro and King (2017) discuss harm in a binary sense,
with respect to “harmed individuals” and raise the question
of whether one is “truly” being harmed or not. However,
standard WHO methodology treats the impact of quality of
life as a continuous unitary quantity per person; that is, a
degree of harm, which is conceptually distinct from the
various factors that may drive it. This quantity may be
elicited using a variety of protocols that involve evaluation
of typical symptomatology. Once a per-person estimate of
harm is created, this estimate is then linked to population
prevalence data to generate a population-level description of
the distribution of harm. To apply such a methodology to
gambling is a difﬁcult and complex; and as a result, the ﬁrst
steps that have been taken in this regard (Browne, Greer,
Rawat, & Rockloff, 2017) must be regarded as preliminary.
However, Delfabbro and King (2017) suggest that we
consider a “meaningful threshold” in evaluating whether
or not speciﬁc harms are truly reducing a person’s quality of
life. Using the WHO elicitation paradigm, respondents are
free to respond zero or “none at all,” in describing the
quality of life impact of a given set of gambling “symptoms”
(or speciﬁc harms). Thus, WHO methods specify a means to
evaluate the severity (or not) of symptoms using elicited
judgments made by experts, sufferers of the condition, or the
community. In our estimation, it is more accurate for many
people, including experts, to rate their subjective experience
or best evaluation of the impacts of harm than for us, as
researchers, to make prior decisions about what harm is
“bad” and what is instead trivial. In sum, we advise against
categorical thinking and arbitrary thresholds, in favor
of empirically derived graduations of both risk and
consequences.
SHOULD GAMBLING HARM BE MEASURED
DICHOTOMOUSLY OR AS A
CONTINUOUS VARIABLE?
Delfabbro and King (2017) raise a fundamental criticism in
regard to treating per-person harm as a “liquid,” that is, a
continuous quantity. They dispute whether it is possible to
compare mild with severe versions of a condition, making
the case that these states are qualitatively different and
therefore incomparable. The contrary position, that it is
possible to compare different health states using a singular
continuous quality of life metric, was ﬁrst comprehensively
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delineated by Murray (1994), and in the last 20 years has
subsequently formed a fundamental premise by the WHO to
evaluate many hundreds of conditions (Salomon et al.,
2012). A defense of the utilitarian philosophical basis of
this core assumption is beyond the scope of this commentary.
However, we note that to reject this premise, one must also
reject the possibility of a quantitative approach of assessing
gambling-related harm – or indeed the population-level
impact of any health condition. We concede that disordered
gambling may be a mental health condition that is qualita-
tively different from milder experiences of gambling harm.
However, our work considers harms as the outcome, and not
someone’s mental health. We argue that harms and their
negative impact on quality of life are an important issue to
address regardless of whether the sufferer has a mental health
condition.
METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
In principle, WHO elicitation methodology automatically
accomplishes Delfabbro and King’s (2017) recommenda-
tion of ensuring that mild harms are appropriately weighted
or even disregarded. However, Delfabbro and King’s (2017)
allude to several important methodological challenges in
eliciting quality of life impact, including framing effects
and stigma toward gambling, that may cause an upward
response bias at the lower end of the spectrum. While these
effects may induce some bias, the magnitude of such effects
would have to be very large to alter our fundamental
conclusions regarding a large quantum of harm among the
set of so-called LR gamblers. We concur with Delfabbro and
King (2017), however, that to achieve a fully balanced
picture of milder forms of harm, it is important to account
for the beneﬁts of gambling. This has not yet been done, and
in our view, represents an important research priority.
SUMMARY
In our estimation, the critique by Delfabbro and King (2017)
makes some errors in the interpretation of our work. First,
our work did not address the logic of the PP, but rather
something superﬁcially similar. We made an observation
that the burden of quality of life impact, from an accumula-
tion of multiple harms, rests heavily on the group of people
who are often described as LR gamblers. The PP logic
remains unaddressed in our data, although we have outlined
a means here by which this might be accomplished. Second,
Delfabbro and King (2017) suggest harms that do not meet a
“meaningful threshold” for impacting on people’s quality of
life be excluded from consideration. However, our method
for aggregation of harms allowed that some harms may be
trivial or have zero impact, and we used a large collection of
experts, gamblers and others to make these judgments.
Finally, Delfabbro and King (2017) suggested that the value
of mass interventions on so-called LR gamblers is found in
preventing people from becoming PGs. In contrast, we
suggest that the value of mass interventions is to reduce
mild-to-moderate harms accruing to the larger number of
non-PGs. In fact, we believe that viewing disordered gam-
bling, a mental health condition, as the only outcome worthy
of study is a real risk to research and policy aimed at
improving public welfare.
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